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Colorsnap! Colour Photography,  
the Market in Patents  
and the 1929 Crash
Michelle Henning
Although very short-lived, the Colorsnap process, promoted in 1928–29 by the 
small British company Colour Snapshots (1928) Ltd, is mentioned in several 
histories of colour photography processes as a key example of a false start in 
colour photography. Such accounts emphasise problems with technical quality 
and poor industrial organisation, but miss the key role of the market in patents 
and changes in investment practices in the period. From 1926 to 1929, the 
London Stock Exchange saw a frenzy of speculative investment in companies 
touting new innovations in media, linked to gramophone, radio, cinema, photo-
graphy and photo-telegraphy. Like most of these companies, Colour Snapshots 
was inexperienced and completely dependent on the success of an untested 
patent. The company promoter deployed the then-common strategy of under-
pricing, consequently the company was undercapitalised and unable to finance 
production. Colour Snapshots was liquidated in the Great Slump of 1929–33. 
This article situates it in wider cultures of the market, in cultural practices of 
invention, and ideologies of modernity and innovation. It argues that the rise 
and fall of Colorsnap expresses the opportunistic practices of invention and 
speculative finance of the time.
Keywords: Ilford, Colour Snapshots, colour photography, amateur photography, 
photography patents, 1929, Wall Street Crash, London Stock Exchange, photography 
industry
The history of colour photography makes depressing reading. It is a story of 
processes born before their time and processes that should never have been 
born at all, of ships that stagger past in the night, founder and rise again keel 
upwards only to be remanned by optimistic crews.1 
When he wrote this in 1938, D.A. Spencer may have had in mind a small 
British firm called Colour Snapshots (1928) Ltd. First announced in the British 
press in spring 1928, Colour Snapshots was floated on the London Stock 
Exchange to great fanfare later the same year. Spencer’s own company, 
Colour Photographs Ltd, which also began operations in 1928, went on to 
dominate professional colour photography in Britain during the 1930s with 
‘Vivex’. The first colour print service for professional photographers in Britain, 
Vivex derived from trichrome carbro printing and used three negatives taken 
simultaneously in dedicated cameras.2 By contrast, the process that Colour 
Snapshots promoted, called ‘Colorsnap’, was aimed firmly at amateur photo-
graphers, such as the holiday photographers who took their films to be 
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used in colour photography.
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Figure 1. llustration from Tarbin’s patent 
showing the layering of the film.
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developed at the high-street chemist.3 This tiny company was the first in 
Britain to offer to the snapshooter market a colour print processing service 
for roll film that promised to be as easy as existing black-and-white services.
An important selling point was that customers could use their existing 
cameras to produce prints rather than transparencies. As the chairman of the 
directors announced to the shareholders:
So far as your directors have been able to ascertain, your process is the only 
one which enables snapshot photographs in natural colours to be taken with 
an ordinary camera, and from such negatives to obtain prints in natural 
colours or in black and white.4 
Specialist colour cameras were expensive and cumbersome. The most popular and 
accessible existing process was the Lumière company’s autochrome glass plate 
process, launched in 1907, which could be used in any plate camera with a tripod, 
but not in a handheld camera. Sheet film versions were introduced in 1930. The 
resulting image was a transparency viewed in a diascope or magic lantern.5 Now, 
Colour Snapshots claimed, colour prints could be available using customers’ 
existing handheld – compact and box – cameras. This idea of colour without big 
and complicated investment was a central plank in the marketing.
It is clear there were severe problems with the quality of Colour Snapshots’ 
output, evident from documentary sources and the few remaining examples of 
their prints. The film was a version of the tripack system invented by Louis Ducos 
du Hauron in 1895 and first marketed circa 1916 by Frederic Ives. In 1927, an 
otherwise unknown inventor called William Thomas Tarbin applied for a patent 
for a roll film made up of three films layered together, each sensitive to a different 
primary colour (figure 1). Colour Snapshots (1928) Ltd bought the patent but 
subsequently found that the layering made the film extraordinarily thick, causing 
the back layer to be underexposed and affecting colour balance, hampering its 
movement through the camera mechanism and reducing sharpness as the layers 
tended to separate. To mitigate this last problem, Colour Snapshots introduced a 
pressure plate, to be placed inside the back of the camera and press the three layers 
of film together. The thin sensitised film was produced by Ilford Ltd, manufacturer 
Figure 2. Unknown, Colorsnap colour 
photograph of a garage forecourt, 1929. 
The Kodak Collection at the National 
Science and Media Museum, Bradford, 
Object Number: 1990-5036/6071/4.
3 – As Peter Buse points out, the English 
vocabulary for describing the wide range of 
amateur photographic practice in the period is 
limiting. Here, I have tried to distinguish 
between the kinds of amateur photographers 
who sent their films and glass plates for pro-
cessing via stores such as Boots and what he 
calls the ‘aspirational amateurs’ – readers of 
and writers to the photographic press. Judging 
from their Merchandise Bulletin and price lists, 
however, Boots also supplied [supplied] this 
kind of amateur with materials, and it is likely 
that a snapshooter could progress to an 
‘aspirational amateur’ via the Photographic 
Department of Boots. Peter Buse, ‘The 
Photographer as Reader: The Aspirational 
Amateur in the Photo-Magazines’, in 
Photography Reframed: New Visions in 
Photographic Culture, ed. Ben Burbridge and 
Annebella Pollen, London: Bloomsbury 2018, 
48.
4 – ‘Colour Snapshots (1928) Limited’, 
Economist (22 December 1928), 1178.
5 – The autochrome was a trichrome screen 
process using a three-colour grain, which 
began on glass plates and was later pro-
duced on sheet film; see Bertrand Lavédrine 
and Jean-Paul Gandolfo, ‘The Autochrome 
Process’, History of Photography, 18:2 
(1994), 120–21. Anne Hammond reports 
that initial demand for the autochrome was 
‘overwhelming’; see Anne Hammond, 
‘Impressionist Theory and the 
Autochrome’, History of Photography, 15:2 
(1991), 97.
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of some of the fastest consumer films on the market, and it was hoped that high 
sensitivity would resolve the exposure issues. The printing process was equally 
fraught with problems: early exhibition prints consisted of layers of celluloid 
mounted on white card, and the eventual commercial process was a photomecha-
nical collotype process based on a 1927 patent, but the prints produced were poor 
quality, and some were hand-retouched (figure 2).6
All in all, the business was a dramatic failure: the film’s arrival on the market 
was delayed, its processing inefficient, results were poor and the company was 
unable to keep up with demand. The ‘brief and inglorious’ story of the Colour 
Snapshots venture was summarised in 1930 by the photographer and author 
Captain Owen Wheeler:
Dazzled by glowing advertisements, the public eagerly bought ‘Colorsnap’ 
films, exposed them, and sent them through their dealers to headquarters for 
treatment. As a rule, weeks of waiting followed, with an eventual intimation 
that the majority of the films had been so wrongly exposed that it was 
impossible to print from them. When prints were supplied, they were usually 
of poor quality, and sometimes mere travesties of the originals [. . .] it will 
probably be some considerable time before a fresh attempt is made in this 
direction.7 
After the stock market crashed at the end of 1929, Colour Snapshots (1928) Ltd 
folded. It was liquidated in December 1929, with actions pending against it. 
Subsequently, colour print (negative) film remained inaccessible for decades. Colour 
reversal (transparency) roll films became available in the 1930s and Ilford briefly 
introduced and then discontinued a colour printing service for its transparency process, 
Dufaycolor.8 Although Agfacolor negative film was introduced in 1939, Kodacolor in 
1942 and Ektacolor in 1947, it was not until the 1960s that colour negative films and 
colour prints began to be regularly used by snapshot photographers.
Although very short-lived, Colorsnap is mentioned in several histories of 
colour photography. These books – by Joseph Friedman, Brian Coe and Jack H. 
Coote – all describe problems with the company’s patents, the poor quality of its 
results and its commercial and practical incompetence.9 These are largely tele-
ological histories which describe a ‘parade of technical forms’.10 While they 
recognise the interwar period as a busy time in colour photography, they tend 
to see it as laying the ground for the successful transparency films introduced by 
Agfa and Kodak, and for the arrival of colour photography as a popular format in 
the postwar period. In such accounts, Colorsnap is treated as a key example of the 
false starts in colour photography that plagued the 1920s and early 1930s and an 
object lesson in the perils of the rush to market an unready technology.
While attention to failure might give the lie to the idea of the heroic upward 
march of technological progress, Colorsnap’s failure is instead used to reinforce 
the sense of the superiority of the technologies and businesses that did survive. In 
his Arcades Project notes, Walter Benjamin observed the tendency to oppose ‘the 
“productive”, “forward-looking”, “lively”, “positive” part of the epoch’ with ‘the 
abortive, retrograde and obsolescent’, pointing to the dependence of ideas of 
progress on this negative image of moments or periods of decline and failure.11 
Here, rather than allowing the ‘abortive’ experiment that was Colorsnap to set the 
later successes of colour photography in high relief, I follow Benjamin in attending 
to the way such defunct and forgotten media and technologies might reveal ‘the 
expression of the economy in its culture’.12 My concern here is not with the causes 
of market and technological failure – or in economics as determining culture – but 
with what the broken promise of Colorsnap expresses and reveals about the 
culture of the market and of photographic innovation in 1928.13
Colorsnap was indisputably a flawed technology, and Colour Snapshots 
(1928) Ltd was an ‘awful business’ both in the literal sense and in the sense of a 
sorry affair. Its story involves poorly tested products, industrial mismanagement 
6 – Edward F. Flammer and Halsey E. 
Silliman, New York, US Patent 1634659. 
The collotype process is described in Dusan 
C. Stulik and Art Kaplan, ‘Collotype’, in 
The Atlas of Analytical Signatures of 
Photographic Processes, Los Angeles: The 
Getty Conservation Institute 2013.
7 – Owen Wheeler, ‘Progress in Colour 
Photography’, Science Progress in the 
Twentieth Century (1919–1933), 25:97 
(1930), 91.
8 – According to Coote, ‘results were not 
good’. Coote, Illustrated History, 50.
9 – Joseph Friedman, History of Colour 
Photography, 2nd edn, Boston: The 
American Photographic Publishing 
Company 1945; Brian Coe, Colour 
Photography: The First Hundred Years, 
1840–1940, London: Ash & Grant 1978; 
and Coote, Illustrated History.
10 – Lisa Gitelman in Geoffrey Batchen and 
Lisa Gitelman, ‘Afterword: Media History 
and History of Photography in Parallel 
Lines’, in Photography and Other Media in 
the Nineteenth Century, ed. Nicoletta 
Leonardi and Simone Natale, University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University 
Press 2018, 207.
11 – Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, 
ed. Rolf Tiedeman, trans. Howard Eiland 
and Kevin McLaughlin, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 459.
12 – Ibid., 460.
13 – On failure, see Jennifer Gabrys, 
‘Machines Fall Apart: Failure in Art and 
Technology’, Leonardo Electronic Almanac, 
13:4 (2005), 9–16. My approach shares a 
media archaeological interest in obsolescent 
and failed media, and in integrating the 
history of photography and media; see Jussi 
Parikka, What is Media Archaeology?, 
London: Polity Press 2012; and 




and flawed patents. But the larger context of Colorsnap’s hasty arrival and dra-
matic departure was the short-lived speculative investment boom prior to the 
stock market crash of 1929. This was linked to a constellation of practices of 
patenting, finance and investment peculiar to 1920s Britain, which enabled specific 
ways of working and available careers, and underpinned the industries that 
supplied the materials and shaped the practices of vernacular photography.
New investors and ventures were spurred by a taste for innovation cultivated via 
the proliferation of brightly colourful commodities and technological novelties. In 
1920s Britain, as Richard Hornsey argues, urban commerce gained a new glamour and 
theatricality, enhanced by the variety of new products on sale and by the presence, in 
stores and on high streets, of novelty entertainments such as the automatic 
photobooth.14 Tom Gunning writes that ‘the “newness” of a new technology, its 
capacity to dazzle us, is always in some sense the product of the discourse surrounding 
it’ – a discourse of modernity and novelty, propagated through exhibitions and 
advertisements, and other forms of promotion.15 Narratives of progress and innova-
tion permeate writing about photographic technologies, but also the utopian fanfare 
that hails their arrival, and shape not only how we understand the past but how the 
present is experienced and a future anticipated.16
This study of Colorsnap draws on my research in the archives of the Ilford Ltd 
photographic firm. This revealed that Ilford invested in the tiny Colour Snapshots 
company and supplied it with its sensitised film base, and that Ilford’s experts became 
involved in the company. Thus, the following account of Colour Snapshots (1928) Ltd 
draws on the business records of Ilford Ltd, as well as other archival sources including 
Kodak Ltd’s research report on the Colorsnap process, and the archives of Boots the 
chemist, one of the major high-street photographic retailers in the period.
A Commercial Colour Print Process
Writing in 1940, Joseph Friedman observed that ‘even colored transparencies, as 
made by Dufaycolor or Kodachrome, have only very limited uses. Colored prints 
on paper are what are really desired’.17 The long-established Lumière autochrome 
was not available in roll film form until the early 1930s – as Lumicolor or Lumière 
Filmcolor – and results could not easily be reproduced in print.18 Unfortunately, 
there is little research on any demand for colour negative film in the interwar 
period, but there are lots of reasons why prints remained more desirable than 
transparencies for the family photographer. Throughout the 1920s, high-street 
stores such as Boots had been heavily promoting picture frames and albums for 
the display and storage of photographs – Boots had over a thousand branches in 
Britain by 1935, most with photography departments. All of the paraphernalia 
associated with presenting and preserving prints was already in place. 
Transparencies required a completely different system, necessitating the purchase 
of more accessories, and they lacked the immediacy of prints.
Colour photography was also expensive. In 1910, an autochrome plate was 
reportedly four and a half times as expensive as its monochrome equivalent; by the 
mid-1930s, judging by the Boots price list, its descendent, Lumière Filmcolor, had 
widened that gap further.19 Colorsnap predated Filmcolor and all the other colour 
reversal or transparency roll films but despite publicity suggesting it would appeal 
to the photographer with a box camera (figure 3) it was also expensive: in June 
1929, Boots announced that the prices would be between three to three and a half 
shillings for a film with four exposures, with developing and printing adding 
another two shillings to the price. These prices are similar to those of the mid- 
1930s colour reversal roll films – Lumière Filmcolor, Agfacolor, Dufaycolor, and 
Kodachrome – supplied by Boots, which all cost between half a shilling and a 
shilling per exposure.20 In contrast, Boots price lists reveal that in the mid 1930s, 
black-and-white roll films retailed at around one shilling for eight exposures.
14 – Richard Hornsey, ‘Francis Bacon and 
the Photobooth: Facing the Homosexual in 
Post–War Britain’, Visual Culture in 
Britain, 8:2 (2007), 83–103.
15 – Tom Gunning, ‘Re-Newing Old 
Technologies: Astonishment, Second Nature, 
and the Uncanny in Technology from the 
Previous Turn-of-the-Century’, in Rethinking 
Media Change: The Aesthetics of Transition, 
ed. David Thorburn and Henry Jenkins, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2003, 43.
16 – Gunning writes that ‘Every new tech-
nology has a utopian dimension that imagines 
a future radically transformed by the implica-
tions of the device or practice’. Ibid. 56.
17 – Joseph Friedman, ‘Color 
Photography’, in American Annual of 
Photography 1941, Vol. 55, ed. Frank R. 
Fraprie and Franklin I. Jordan, Boston: 
American Photographic Publishing Co. 
1940, 228. In 1935, the Boots Merchandise 
Bulletin was still advising salespeople to 
clarify that Dufaycolor was a transparency, 
not print film, implying ongoing demand 
for colour prints. ‘Photographic 
Department: Processing of Dufaycolor 
Films’ Merchandise Bulletin (26 August 
1935), 4411, Walgreen Boots Alliance 
Archive.
18 – Nathalie Boulouch, ‘The Documentary 
Use of the Autochrome in France’, History 
of Photography, 18:2 (1994), 143.
19 – According to the National Science and 
Media Museum blog, ‘Their relatively high 
cost was the subject of frequent comment 
in the photographic press and clearly had 
some effect in limiting the process’s wider 
popularity’. Available at https://blog.scien 
ceandmediamuseum.org.uk/autochromes- 
the-dawn-of-colour-photography/ 
(accessed 7 November 2020).
20 – Excluding processing, although 
Kodachrome included processing and 
postage in the price of twelve shillings and 
sixpence for an eighteen-exposure spool. 
Pre-war (late 1930s) undated Price List of 
Photographic Material, Walgreen Boots 
Alliance Archive, WBA/BT/11/37/1/27.
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Figure 3. Colour Snapshots advertisement, 




In 1928, the colour print processes used by professionals and keen amateurs 
were extremely expensive and very laborious. Generally, they were produced by 
taking three exposures on black-and-white film with colour filters on a conven-
tional plate camera using a tripod, or by using the new, heavy one-shot colour 
camera, which took three simultaneous images. Printing would then usually be 
done using either the imbibition or the three-colour carbro transfer process, both 
of which were highly complicated. As Sally Stein writes, ‘one could nearly make a 
painting in the time it took to produce a decent color print’.21 Pamela Roberts 
describes three-colour printing processes on paper as involving ‘more than 80 
precise and exact steps, none of which could be omitted, and it could take up to 10 
hours to make a single print’.22
The demand for colour was associated with modernity, with the growing 
consumer society of the 1920s, and the newly spectacular urban and commer-
cial environment. Most movie films were coloured in this period: by the early 
1920s, alongside ‘natural’ colour processes such as Kinemacolor, about eighty 
to ninety per cent of all prints of movie films shown in Britain were tinted or 
toned.23 Sarah Street says that this proliferation of colour in the era of silent 
movies ‘contrasts markedly with the period 1930–55 when colour was nowhere 
near as all-pervasive’.24 Colour prints were regularly shown in exhibitions, and 
autochromes were shown in public lectures and talks. Books and magazines 
included half-tone colour reproductions of photographs, as well as colour 
illustrations, although the expense limited their use.25 The introduction of 
new synthetic dyes in the nineteenth century, along with manufacturing pro-
cesses that lowered the costs of colour reproduction, had already hastened the 
spread of colour in commodities and high streets before World War I, which as 
Regina Lee Blaszczyk puts it, ‘sharpened the eye and whetted the appetite for 
colour’.26 New artificial dyes combined with new materials made possible 
colourful rayon dresses, colourful window displays and even colourful foods. 
This blossoming of colour expanded with the growth of the department stores, 
cinema chains and chain stores, and of a lower middle class with money to 
spend on novelties.
During the interwar period, Europe increasingly adopted American colour 
practices and a sales culture that emphasised colour as an important aspect of 
consumer choice. As Blaszczyk’s work shows, an ‘American predilection for bright 
hues’ and new ‘colour management’ techniques spread from the USA to Britain in the 
1920s, and this new field of expertise ‘aimed to make commercial color predictable 
and thereby more profitable’.27 In Britain, one person making a name as a colour 
consultant was Major Adrian B. Klein, later known as Cornwell-Clyne, an artist who 
worked in camouflage during wartime, as a colour consultant to the calico industry, 
designed a colour projector for stage lighting and was also listed as a scientific 
consultant on Colour Snapshots’ share prospectus. Later, he was on the payroll as 
controller of production technology, and became a director of Colour Snapshots’ 
printing company.28
Despite an evident desire and demand for colour, Stephen Milanowski argues 
that in still photography there was limited incentive for the big players in the 
industry to produce a popular and affordable process, given the huge profits 
reaped by black and white during the 1929 boom.29 Yet firms were nevertheless 
financing research into colour processes, fuelled by the demand for reliable and 
practical cinema colour: the rapidly expanding Ilford company opened its research 
laboratory, Rodenside, in Ilford, on the eastern fringes of London, in 1925 and had 
been looking for a colour process since they had begun manufacturing film, in 
addition to plates, in 1921.30 Kodak Ltd, the British subsidiary of Eastman Kodak, 
researched nascent colour processes at its research laboratory at Harrow, West 
London, which opened in 1928.31 Eastman Kodak already had the first version of 
Kodacolor movie film and was conducting ongoing research under the direction of 
21 – Sally Stein, Harry Callahan,  Tucson, 
AZ: Center for Creative Photography 1980, 
6.
22 – Pamela Roberts, The Genius of Colour 
Photography: From the Autochrome to the 
Digital Age, London: André Deutsch, 2007, 
72.
23 – Scott Higgins, Harnessing the 
Technicolor Rainbow: Color Design in the 
1930s, Austin: University of Texas Press 
2007, 2.
24 – Sarah Street, Colour Films in Britain: 
The Negotiation of Innovation 1900–1955, 
London: Bloomsbury 2019, 10.
25 – Anne Hammond mentions exhibitions 
of colour collotypes between 1906 and 
1916; see Hammond, ‘Impressionist Theory 
and the Autochrome’, 98. Boulouch write 
that one shortcoming of the autochrome 
process in France was that few journals 
could afford half-tone reproduction in col-
our; see Boulouch, ‘Documentary Use of 
the Autochrome’, 143.
26 – Regina Lee Blaszczyk, ‘True Blue: 
DuPont and the Color Revolution’, 
Chemical Heritage, 25:3 (2007), 20–25.
27 – Bright Modernity: Color, Commerce, 
and Consumer Culture, ed. Regina Lee 
Blaszczyk and Uwe Spiekermann, London: 
Palgrave Macmillan 2017, 12. The British 
Colour Council, ‘a major effort to rationa-
lize color selection for British industry 
based on the American trade-association 
model’, dates from late 1920s and was 
incorporated in 1930; see Regina Lee 
Blaszczyk, ‘The Color Schemers: American 
Color Practice in Britain, 1920s–1960s’, 
ibid., 201.
28 – ‘Colour Snapshots Failure’, Financial 
Times (20 December 1929), 14. Klein was 
the son of a Jewish German music critic 
and an English writer, who later changed 
his name to Cornwell-Clyne due to war-
time hostility towards ‘enemy aliens’ in 
1940. He published Colour-Music, the Art 
of Light (London: Crosby Lockwood and 
Son) in 1926 and Colour Cinematography 
(London: Chapman and Hall) a decade 
later.
29 – W. T. Hanson, ‘Forty Years of Color 
Photography’, cited in Stephen R. 
Milanowski, ‘Factors Influencing the 
Neglect of Color Photography: 1860 to 
1970’, PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology 1982, 118.
30 – R. J. Hercock and G. A. Jones, Silver by 
the Ton: A History of Ilford Limited 1879– 
1979, Maidenhead: McGraw–Hill Book 
Company 1979.
31 – See G. B. Harrison, ‘The Laboratories 
of Ilford Limited’, Proceedings of the Royal 
Society, London, 142:906 (1954), 9; and D. 
E. H. Edgerton, ‘Industrial Research in the 
British Photographic Industry, 1879–1939’, 
in The Challenge of New Technology: 
Innovation in British Business since 1850, 
ed. Jonathan Liebenau, Aldershot: Gower 
1988, 106–34.
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British chemist C. E. K. Mees (Kenneth Mees) at their research laboratory in 
Rochester, New York.32
Ilford Ltd kept quiet its links with Colour Snapshots (1928) Ltd, reflecting the 
cautious and secretive approach of its wider business strategy in the period. The 
firm was coming to the end of a period of growth in which it had absorbed smaller 
British firms and their products through amalgamations and buy-outs, in a 
‘horizontal’ expansion barely visible to consumers, since the smaller family firms 
it took over, companies such as Illingworth and the Imperial Dry Plate company, 
retained their original names and branding.33 This strategy was partly a response 
to the British suspicion of monopoly: at the start of the 1920s, after a flurry of 
corporate amalgamations followed by recession, monopolies had become asso-
ciated with price-fixing.34 At the same time it allowed the company to have fingers 
in several pies, to capitalise on successful brands and test out the viability of 
products without staking their reputation. This appears to have been the strategy 
with Colour Snapshots – possibly Ilford hoped to gain a foothold in colour 
photography at no risk to itself and very little capital outlay.
The Rise and Fall of Colour Snapshots
The advertisements for Colorsnap roll film announced that ‘Colour photography 
is here – for you’ (figure 4). The slogan refers to the idea that colour print 
photography, ‘not tinted afterwards, but taken in colour, printed in colour’ (ori-
ginal emphases) would now be an affordable and practical process for snapshoo-
ters. It frames Colorsnap film as something expected and awaited, not disruptive 
and shocking but an almost inevitable arrival – finally, it is here!
Despite the flaws in the process, as already outlined, early reports were very 
positive. The Times’s Scientific Correspondent, zoologist Peter Chalmers Mitchell, 
was shown what he considered to be ‘amazing results’ in May 1928, although he 
did not mention the company or the inventor, alluding instead to ‘a small group of 
scientific and business men who have combined their efforts for several years, and 
have had a laboratory at work for two years continuously’.35 When the company 
was floated on the London Stock Exchange in October 1928, the shares were 
heavily oversubscribed, and in December 1928 at the statutory meeting of the 
shareholders, the chairman described ‘unabated’ interest in the new product: ‘The 
number of enquiries, from both the trade and the public, have reached a total 
which approaches five figures’.36 The same month, Colour Snapshots held an 
exhibition of prints, which was reviewed positively in The Times.37 At the time 
of the flotation, Boots the Chemist reported that customers were requesting 
Colorsnap film although the film had not yet been launched.38
Nevertheless, there were early signs of problems. The December exhibition 
was organised in response to demand for some assurance about the quality of the 
product. Among the visitors were representatives of Kodak Ltd’s research labora-
tory at Harrow, which undertook, the following February, to investigate the 
process, as yet not on the market. The report authored by Dr Walter Clark is 
damning. He claimed that the experts the company had sent did not really 
understand the process and concluded that there were serious problems with the 
film. Issues of quality had already been noted by Chalmers Mitchell in his early 
review of the process. He saw, but was not unduly concerned by, a slight softness 
or haziness in the results.39 He also described the early printing process as a little 
unsatisfactory and remarked that, ‘printing in colour on paper requires apparatus 
not in the possession or within the skill of most amateurs’.40 Kodak Ltd’s inves-
tigation found that problems with the film were linked to its thickness and the 
difficulty of the three layers remaining flat – and remarking upon the poor quality 
of the finished prints, Clark wrote: ‘All were diffuse, and most of the colours 
32 – See C. E. K. Mees, ‘A Photographic 
Research Laboratory’, Journal of the Royal 
Society of Arts, 68:3539 (1920), 702. For a 
detailed technical history of colour cine-
matography, see Adrian Cornwell-Clyne, 
Colour Cinematography, 3rd edn, London: 
Chapman & Hall 1951. For more recent, 
critical work on colour cinema, see Street, 
Colour Films in Britain ; and Sarah Street 
and Joshua Yumibe, Chromatic Modernity: 
Color, Cinema, and Media of the 1920s, 
New York: Columbia University Press 
2019.
33 – As Lutz Alt points out, this weakened 
Ilford Ltd’s brand identity; see Lutz Alt, 
‘The Photochemical Industry: Historical 
Essays in Business Strategy and 
Internationalization’, PhD thesis, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
1986, 141.
34 – ‘The Trust Movement in Great Britain 
– Further Illustrations – IV’, Economist (12 
January 1924), 47–48.
35 – Peter Chalmers Mitchell, ‘The 
Progress of Science, Snapshots in Colour, 
Process for Amateurs’, The Times (21 May 
1928), 23.
36 – ‘Colour Snapshots (1928) Limited’, 
1178.
37 – ‘Colour Snapshots’, The Times, (10 
December 1928), 8.
38 – ‘Coloured Snapshots’, Merchandise 
Bulletin (30 October 1928), 964, Walgreen 
Boots Alliance Archive.




false’.41 Clark had tested the process using a no. 1 Pocket Kodak. He suggested that 
it would be very difficult for amateurs to achieve good results, and concluded that:
The process is theoretically not sound; the process is not capable of yielding 
satisfactory colour prints even in the hands of experts; trouble is anticipated 
in practice through lack of contact of the roll-films components and in the 
low effective speed of the films; the process itself is not really understood by 
the Colorsnap experts; the method of processing is so uncertain and involved 
as to be of doubtful commercial value as a D & P [Developing and Printing] 
proposition.42 
Such concerns about quality need to be understood in the light of the 
simultaneous investigations by Clark and Kodak into other colour processes, 
and of the changing standards and expectations of mass amateur black-and- 
white photography in the period.43 The 1920s amateur market increasingly 
included photographers who had little or no technical interest in photography, 
perhaps even using cheap cameras acquired with cigarette coupons and chocolates. 
In 1927, Boots noted that eighty per cent of customers used simple cameras on 
which the largest available aperture was f11, too small for low light, and that the 
limited light in Britain during most months and hours of the day meant long 
exposures that increased the likelihood of blur. Very few customers invested in a 
tripod or an exposure meter.44 Despite Boots’ best efforts to promote sales of 
enlargements, many were happy with small contact prints, in which soft focus is 
much less evident.45 Such customers already had fairly low standards and expecta-
tions of print photography, and might not be very exercised by the poor quality of 
Colorsnap prints. On the other hand, the poor sensitivity of the Colorsnap film 
aggravated their already slim chances of getting a decent exposure, even with the 
fast -by 1920s standards- Ilford film. Also, since Colorsnap was relatively expen-
sive, and regardless of its novelty value, it may have appealed to a different, more 
discerning kind of customer.
Perhaps more concerning than low quality was the evident attempt by Colour 
Snapshots to mislead the public. Clark’s discussion with representatives of Colour 
Snapshots revealed, he claimed, that some of the best prints shown in the 
December exhibition ‘were not Colorsnap films at all, but three-colour carbon 
prints, while others were obviously retouched with brush and paints’.46 Nor did 
the company deliver on promised deadlines. In February 1929, the film’s launch 
was promised immanently, according to the Boots Merchandise Bulletin. Yet only 
that month did the company purchase the British and European rights to Flammer 
and Silliman’s patent, for a cheap mass printing process, and only then did it set 
up a separate company, Photograde Ltd, to produce the prints. March came and 
went, and the film was still not available and neither had the developing and 
processing laboratory been completed.
The process was not widely promoted by Boots, one of the leading high-street 
chemists which was under US ownership during the 1920s. Boots was an official 
Kodak dealer that regularly urged its salespeople to ‘Push the Kodak film’, but 
which did stock a wide range of films by its competitors.47 The company’s 
Merchandise Bulletin, a weekly magazine addressed to its salespeople, advised 
staff to only take Colorsnap orders at customers’ own risk as they would not be 
able to guarantee customer satisfaction.48 The films eventually became available in 
May, but the Bulletin warned: ‘Colour Snapshots (1928) Ltd, can only supply 
Coloursnap [sic] Roll Film in very small quantities. We believe the real reason is 
that they are unable to develop and print them in a reasonable time’. Boots also 
refused to make window displays, citing a lack of confidence in the quality of the 
product.49 In June, Colour Snapshots claimed it was struggling to keep up with 
demand and asked customers to use it ‘sparingly until the increased supply already 
arranged for is available’ (figure 4).50
41 – Walter Clark, ‘Report on “Colorsnap” 
Process of Colour Photography’, Harrow 
Research Reports, 1:H84 (1 February 1929), 
1, Kodak Limited Archive, British Library.
42 – Ibid.
43 – Nicholas le Guern details Clark’s visits 
to the Keller-Dorian works in Paris in 
January 1929, only just before the 
Colorsnap tests, with a view to the use of 
their reproduction process for Kodak’s new 
Kodacolor movie film. Nicholas Le Guern, 
‘Contribution of the European Kodak 
Research Laboratories to Innovation 
Strategy at Eastman Kodak’, PhD Thesis, 
De Montfort University 2017, 246.
44 – ‘Photoettes: The Tripod – a Necessity’, 
The Bee (September 1927), 438. Even the 
fastest films available in 1927 were extre-
mely slow by modern standards. The Bee, 
Boots’ in-house staff magazine, noted that 
most successful pictures by customers were 
exposed on a sunny day at around one- 
twenty-fifth of a second. At this speed, a 
tripod was advisable, and motion blur 
likely. Lenses on cheap box cameras were 
slow and poor quality. Films had greater 
exposure latitude than modern film, but 
exposure meters, where they were used, 
were fiddly and likely inaccurate.
45 – That is, prints made without an 
enlarger, on the same scale as the negative. 
‘Easy Extra Photo Money’, Merchandise 
Bulletin (12 April 1932), 2497, Walgreen 
Boots Alliance Archive.
46 – Clark, ‘Report on “Colorsnap”’, 1 and 
12.
47 – ‘Photographic Dept.’, Merchandise 
Bulletin (24 May 1927), 518, Walgreen 
Boots Alliance Archive.
48 – ‘Photographic Dept.: Colorsnap Film 
(3/-, 3/6) - Important’, Merchandise 
Bulletin (30 April 1929), 1168, Walgreen 
Boots Alliance Archive.
49 – ‘Photographic Dept.: Colour 
Snapshots’, Merchandise Bulletin (14 May 
1929), 1185, Walgreen Boots Alliance 
Archive (original emphasis); ‘Snapshots in 
Colour’, Merchandise Bulletin (21 May 
1929), 1193.
50 – ‘Colour Snapshots (1928) Ltd’, The 
Times (10 June 1929), 12.
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Figure 4. Colour Snapshots advertisement, 
‘Take it in Colour’, 24 June 1929.
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As 1929 ended, so did Colour Snapshots (1928) Ltd.51 The managing director, 
Arthur John Clark, resigned in November 1929 and was taken to court, but 
acquitted, for having transferred money from Colour Snapshots (Foreign) Ltd – 
which represented the foreign rights – to prop up Colour Snapshots (1928) Ltd.52 
Both Colour Snapshots (Foreign) Ltd and Photograde Ltd were wound up in the 
early 1930s. Shares in Colour Snapshots’ overseas concerns continued to be 
promoted as late as November 1929, when the Sydney Morning Herald reported 
the arrival in Australia of two representatives of the company, Mr C. E. Ross and 
Mr S. G. Haslam, who announced, against all evidence, that ‘the process had been 
a great success in England’.53
The Market in Patents
In many ways, Colour Snapshots (1928) Ltd was a product of the market in 
patents in the late 1920s. Even at the time, it was noted that Colour Snapshots 
was a company formed primarily to exploit certain patents, that this was not a 
good basis for investment and that the patent system needed to be reformed.54 
More and more patents were being granted: by the late 1920s, the British patent 
office was struggling to function, with a massive backlog of thousands of specifica-
tions being filed, and the arrears increasing at a rate of seventy-six specifications 
per week.55 Military demand in the 1914–18 war, along with the expansion of the 
electricity supply, and protectionist legislation such as the 1927 Cinematograph 
Films Act had accelerated developments in media, including photography, and 
produced a proliferation of patents in these fields.56 Cornwell-Clyne details the 
vast number of colour film-related patents in his book Colour Cinematography, 
first published in 1936.57
This surge in patenting was also linked to the fact that patents were regarded 
by company promoters and investors as core assets of a company, and would be 
referenced in marketing to investors.58 Intangible assets such as patents dominated 
the market in the months leading up to the September financial crisis in London, 
and the Wall Street Crash a month later, in October 1929.59 Nearly all of the new 
companies launched onto the London Stock Exchange in 1928 were reliant on 
patents as assets. As with the patents that underpinned Colour Snapshots (1928) 
Ltd, generally these were new versions of older inventions. Many of them related 
to film, photography and other media: between 1926 and 1929, the London Stock 
Exchange saw a frenzy of speculative investment in companies touting new 
patented products in gramophone and radio, automatic photograph booths, colour 
photography, colour cinema and sound film technologies, and photo-telegraphy – 
wire photography or fax.60
The use of patents as assets drove a thriving market for technical innovation 
in Britain, where independent inventors would patent their invention in the hope 
of selling or licensing it to one of the big companies.61 While some viewed the 
patent system as a strong stimulus to research in the photographic industries, 
especially in the case of colour film – Victor Gallafent, Ilford Ltd’s chartered 
patent agent, viewed it in this way – it was also being used by the major foreign 
firms’ British subsidiaries, such as Kodak Ltd, to suppress competition through the 
threat of patent litigation.62 The big firms would also use patents as a source of 
profit by collecting an income through their patents: David Harvey describes this 
as a ‘monopoly rent’.63
Tom Nicholas argues that in 1930 independent inventors, most of whom 
identified their profession as ‘engineer’, produced a remarkably high number of 
patents, including many of the most highly cited ones. Writing about invention 
and patenting across a wide range of industries in Britain between 1880 and 
1930, Nicholas claims that ‘innovation crucially depended on breakthroughs 
51 – Ibid.
52 – ‘An Old Bailey Acquittal’, The Times 
(24 October 1930), 11.
53 – ‘Snapshots in Colour: New Process for 
Amateurs’, Sydney Morning Herald (14 
November 1929), 16.
54 – ‘Capital Issues’, Economist (6 October 
1928), 614.
55 – By the 1920s, the view that the patent 
system needed reform was gaining traction; 
see Robert Burrell, ‘The Reform of the 
British Patent System’, Journal of the Royal 
Society of Arts 77: 4002 (1929), 923–952.
56 – The British government announced 
that it would be constructing the National 
Grid in 1926, the proposal for Battersea 
Power Station was made in 1927, and con-
struction work began in 1929.
57 – Cornwell-Clyne, Colour 
Cinematography, appendices.
58 – Stathis Arapostathis, ‘Meters, Patents 
and Expertise(s): Knowledge Networks in 
the Electricity Meters Industry, 1880–1914’, 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 
Part A, 44: 2 (2013), 237.
59 – Tom Nicholas, ‘Does Innovation 
Cause Stock Market Runups? Evidence 
from the Great Crash’, American Economic 
Review, 98:4 (2008), 1371.
60 – A. Harris, ‘A Re-analysis of the 1928 
New Issue Boom’, Economic Journal, 171:43 
(1933), 453–55.
61 – Le Guern details the patenting prac-
tices in colour photography in the 1930s, 
and notes the role of the examiner at the 
British Patent Office in the 1930s being the 
third ‘expert interlocutor as part of a 
scientific collaboration in the patent draft-
ing process’. See Le Guern, ‘Contribution of 
the European Kodak Research 
Laboratories’, Chapter 5; and ibid., 284, 
footnote 154.
62 – Victor Gallafent stated that ‘barring 
one way of approach to the solution of a 
problem is a strong stimulus to a research 
worker to find another route’; see Victor 
Gallafent, ‘The Direction of Photographic 
Research’, Photographic Journal, 94 (April 
1954), 118. At Kodak, the patent system 
guaranteed the company’s intellectual 
property, but its bureaucracy also con-
strained photographic research; see Le 
Guern, ‘Contribution of the European 
Kodak Research Laboratories’, 17 and 63.
63 – David Harvey, Seventeen 
Contradictions and the End of Capitalism, 
London: Profile Books 2015, 251. As 
Carolyn C. Cooper has argued, there is an 
‘inherent tension’ between ‘patent mono-
poly as stimulation of invention and as 
restriction on innovation’; see Carolyn C. 
Cooper, ‘Making Inventions Patent’, 
Technology and Culture, 32:4 (1991), 839.
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from inventors functioning outside firms’.64 In 1953, Gallafent wrote that free-
lance inventors were commonplace in photography in the interwar period.65 This 
was not new: invention in colour seems to have taken place outside the established 
firms to an unusually large extent. Gallafent noted that Dr Rudolph Fischer, who 
first invented subtractive colour photography circa 1912, was an amateur or 
freelancer unconnected to the industry, as were Leopold Godowsky and Leopold 
Mannes, the professional musicians who in the late 1920s were working on the 
early version of Kodachrome, with investment from Eastman Kodak. However, 
‘amateur’ or ‘independent’ in relation to the photographic industry does not 
signify a lack of formal training: Mannes and Godowsky were university graduates 
in physics and chemistry.66
Nevertheless, this association with independent and amateur inventors made 
colour photography appear disreputable. In 1918, one writer described it as the 
world of ‘arrant imposters [. . .] amateurs, tinkerers and handymen’, and in 1938 
D. A. Spencer, cited earlier, described colour as having been ‘the happy hunting 
ground of the crook and the crank’.67 Even Cornwell-Clyne wrote that in the field 
of additive colour processes ‘confidence tricksters abound’.68 Some independent 
inventors appear to have lacked any prior or subsequent reputation in photogra-
phy: Coote mentions the reliance of Colour Snapshots (1928) Ltd on patents by 
Tarbin, ‘who appears to have been a newcomer in the field’ and who made no 
further patents in colour photography.69 It is perhaps indicative of the status of 
patents as knowledge capital that the managing director of Colour 
Snapshots (1928) Ltd, Arthur John Clark, a chartered accountant, filed several 
patents remarkably similar to Tarbin’s in his own name.70
Today, not only the independence of the inventor, or their inexperience, but 
also the diversity of backgrounds reinforces the impression of ‘cranks’ and ‘tin-
kerers’. The culture of invention and innovation in 1920s Britain meant that even 
quite established and reputable figures could have extraordinarily diverse careers 
and might appear as dilettantes or quacks from a present perspective. It was a 
period in which the boundaries between different fields were very porous, espe-
cially for upper middle-class men. Self-made, entrepreneurial and semi-indepen-
dent inventors existed alongside the growing class of university-educated 
professional scientists. A research chemist or engineer in the photographic indus-
tries might have a university degree in their field, but many arrived via other 
routes, through industry, the arts and the military. This is even more true of 
company directors and technical advisors, including, for example, Cornwell-Clyne 
(Klein).
Nicholas le Guern argues that Kodak’s Research Laboratories were initially 
intended to protect the company’s intellectual property by taking innovation in- 
house and replacing the potentially leaky system of dependence on external 
inventors and advisors.71 Ilford Ltd, by contrast, was notorious for undervaluing 
its own chemists and relying on outside consultants.72 Yet the case of another key 
figure in Colorsnap reveals that the distinction between the independent inventor 
and the firm is hard to draw in the case of Ilford. Thomas Thorne Baker’s patents 
formed key assets for Colour Snapshots, and he was one of the technical and 
scientific advisors listed in the publicity material and the prospectus of Colour 
Snapshots (1928) Ltd. He worked for the Imperial Dry Plate Company (then 
owned by Ilford) as a researcher or research director, until 1929, and was also 
on the payroll of Illingworth, another company under Ilford Ltd’s control from the 
early 1920s. In 1927, Thorne Baker was appointed to a committee to help improve 
collaboration and rationalise operations between the partner companies, over-
seeing the exchange of confidential information between the companies, especially 
between the heads of the different laboratories.73 In other words, he seems to have 
been simultaneously working for outside concerns and maintaining a trusted role 
within the firm.
64 – Tom Nicholas sampled patents from 
decade intervals between 1880 and 1930, 
using patent citations and renewals to 
assess the value or importance of a patent 
and thus the quality of research being done 
by independent inventors. See Tom 
Nicholas, ‘Independent Invention during 
the Rise of the Corporate Economy in 
Britain and Japan’, Economic History 
Review, 64:3 (2011), 997.
65 – Gallafent, ‘Direction of Photographic 
Research’, 118.
66 – Ibid. Le Guern, drawing on Brayer’s 
biography of George Eastman, makes the 
point; see Le Guern, ‘Contribution of the 
European Kodak Research Laboratories’, 
249–58.
67 – Marcus Lovelace in the 1918 American 
Annual of Photography, cited in 
Milanowski, ‘Factors Influencing the 
Neglect of Color Photography’, 118; and 
Spencer, Colour Photography in Practice, ix.
68 – Cornwell-Clyne, Colour 
Cinematography, 19.
69 – Coote, Illustrated History, 106 and 
108.
70 – In August 1928 he filed patents for a 
tripack process in Austria, France and 
Denmark, and in October 1928 in 
Switzerland.
71 – Le Guern, ‘Contribution of the 
European Kodak Research Laboratories’, 
14.
72 – David Edgerton argues that Ilford 
Ltd’s conducted its search for a colour 
process outside the firm because it failed to 
invest in organic chemistry research among 
its own scientists; see Edgerton, ‘Industrial 
Research’, 123–24.
73 – Evidence of Thorne Baker’s employ-
ment in the Research Department of 
Imperial Dry Plate Co. Ltd can be found in 
the archives of Ilford Ltd at Redbridge 
Museum and Heritage Centre, Ilford, Box 
1375 90/359/B1/A25 and 359/B1/B12/1. 
The cash books of Illingworth reveal he was 
paid a salary by Illingworth from 
November 1925 to October 1928; see 
National Science and Media Museum, ILF 
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activities with that company connected to 
his role at Ilford Ltd.
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Thorne Baker’s career itself is in many ways an expression of the market in 
patents. A widely respected pioneer in photography, with an extraordinarily long 
career, he registered numerous patents, most in the field of photography, and was 
described by the New York Times as ‘the indefatigable Mr. Thorne Baker’.74 As 
early as 1899, when he was only eighteen years old, he had applied for a patent for 
a method of tinting photographs. He had sold Ilford Ltd the formula for their 
hugely successful X-ray plate, marketed from 1907.75 From early experiments in 
photo-telegraphy in 1907 (figure 5), his 1920s Izon wireless picture system and his 
1915 X-ray intensifying screens to his patents underpinning the Dufaycolor system 
in the early 1930s and his postwar research at fluorescent inks manufacturer Dane 
and Co., Thorne Baker’s inventive practice was widely known and often commer-
cially successful.76 Yet he also patented what now appear as bizarre and even 
dangerous historical curiosities, such as a means to intensively farm plants and 
chickens using powerful electromagnetic fields from a Tesla coil, techniques for 
Figure 5. Thorne Baker with his tele- 
photographic apparatus. Reproduced in 
Scientific American 102: 21 (21 May , 1910), 
417.
74 – ‘Kills Mites in Cheese: Thorne Baker’s 
Latest Electrical Device Proves a Success’, 
New York Times (22 September 1912), 4. 
Thorne Baker wrote at least ten books on 
photography, telegraphy, radiography and 
television, and was a prolific columnist for 
several newspapers and the photographic 
press from around 1900.
75 – It ‘dominated the British market until 
it was replaced by the X–ray film in 1923’; 
see Hercock and Jones, Silver by the Ton, 
117.
76 – In the late 1920s, he was involved in 
the purchase and development of the 
French Dufay process by UK company 
Spicers. On Dane and Co., see Eric Kindel, 
‘Cheap Jack Flash’, Eye: The International 
Review of Graphic Design (Summer 2006), 
available at http://www.eyemagazine.com/ 
feature/article/cheap–jack–flash (accessed 5 
July 2020).
Colour Photography, the Market in Patents and the 1929 Crash
279
using radium waste in farming and radium bath salts – before the dangers of 
radium were widely recognised.77
The patenting system enabled industrial scientists, manufacturing engineers 
and professional inventors – who may have not had a formal scientific training – 
to publicise their inventions and protect their intellectual property at little cost and 
without having to go through the possibly hostile peer-review of academic 
publishing.78 As he maintained a parallel career as popular author and journalist, 
Thorne Baker was in the fortunate position of being able to advertise and promote 
his patents and inventions in the daily papers including Time and New York 
Times, in specialist journals like the British Journal of Photography and through 
demonstrations and public talks. To create media coverage he used publicity 
stunts, employing his own daughter Yvonne as an experimental subject in pro-
moting his Tesla coil trials, claiming that like the chickens she would grow larger 
but also hopefully more intelligent. He knew how to attract headlines with phrases 
such as ‘Radium Radishes’ and ‘Electric Chickens’.79
This diversity of patents in combination with entrepreneurship, self-publicity 
and work within the firm was not unusual in the culture of 1920s science, even if 
Thorne Baker was especially ‘indefatigable’. The photography industry was notor-
iously secretive, especially in relation to emulsion formulae as these were difficult, 
if not impossible, to protect with patents.80 Patents offered a way for inventors and 
manufacturers to share some information publicly but a new invention had to be 
supported with publicity, otherwise, as George Eastman noted in 1914, ‘it might be 
hidden for a hundred years’.81
Shareholders and the Appeal of Innovation
Like Colour Snapshots (1928) Ltd, the majority of the new firms that were floated 
on the Stock Exchange in 1928 went bust in the Great Slump of 1929–33. Also like 
Colour Snapshots, many of the small companies of 1928–29 were entirely inexper-
ienced and had not yet mass-produced a product, often being completely depen-
dent on the success of one poorly tested system. Shareholders were sold a promise 
with little evidence of the company’s ability to realise it. An article in the 
Economist in October 1928 underlined the speculative nature of Colour 
Snapshots investments, noting that:
The popularity of amateur photography is undoubted, but the prospectus 
estimate of annual profits of £244,890 (on an authorised capital of £350,000) 
on the basis of a ‘rough calculation’ that 2 million people use snapshot 
cameras and that five per cent. of these will use 10 rolls of the company’s 
films a year – is at present merely an interesting arithmetical exercise.82 
In this the company was far from unique. The following month, the Economist 
commented:
The flood-tide of the new issues season is again at its height… this autumnal 
rush has seemed to include a more than usually large proportion of highly 
speculative enterprises born of the popularity of shilling shares, and nurtured 
by the boom in safety glass, gramophones, and photographic processes.83 
There were more ‘new issues’ floated on the London Stock Exchange in 1928 than 
in any other year between 1915 and 1986.84 New issues or ‘Initial Public Offerings’ 
describe the moment a firm is first listed on the stock exchange through selling 
shares to outside investors. This flotation establishes the firm as a public company, 
enabling it to raise new capital to fund the business, or with more established 
firms, allowing the existing owners to withdraw or begin to withdraw from own-
ership. Investments in new issues are risky, especially if the firms are young and 
unproven, and the capital raised is known as risk or venture capital. A 1933 article 
77 – In 1914, he patented ‘a soluble radio-
active salt for use in preparing baths’ by 
adding radium–barium chloride to bath 
salts. His involvement in The Radium Salt 
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1897–1919’, Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science Part A, 44:2 (2013), 
219; and Stathis Arapostathis and Graeme 
Gooday, ‘Electrical Technoscience and 
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in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 
44 (2013), 203.
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Author of Elephants on Acid, London: 
Boxtree 2011.
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technical papers’ on topics other than 
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by R. A. Harris in the Economic Journal identified 277 new issues in 1928, of which 
109 could be described as truly new ventures. Harris describes these as follows:
The chief groupings among the 109 issues were: Gramophones and Radio, 21; 
Artificial Silk, etc., 10; Finance, 10; Films, Cinemas, and Theatres, 8; Portrait 
Machines, 7. Other interesting undertakings include Safety Glass, 4; Coloured 
Photography, 3; Automatic Vendor Machines, 2. One company was to equip 
a ‘Mobile Seagoing Factory’ to engage in fish-canning at sea.85 
Among the new companies, there was eighty-three per cent depreciation by May 
1931, by which time of the 109 new companies at least seventy-five were wound up 
or valueless, including all seven of the ‘Portrait Machine’ (photobooth) 
companies.86
The fate of these companies was not entirely predictable. In cinema sound, for 
example, companies failed, according to Robert Murphy’s analysis, not because their 
systems were unviable or inherently flawed, nor due to lack of demand, but through a 
range of factors including unpreparedness, inexperience, limited capital, powerful US 
monopolies and inferior quality of manufacture. In other cases, demand was a 
significant factor, for instance in the case of the pricy Fultograph receiver, which 
cost the equivalent of two months’ average salary. This was a device for receiving still 
pictures by radio, a precursor of the fax machine, based on Thorne Baker’s Izon 
system. Fultograph sales were pitiful, despite support from the BBC which broadcast 
the illustrated radio programmes that the Fultograph would accompany from 30 
October 1928.87 In radio, foreign competition was key: the change from the crystal 
set to the valve radio during 1927–31 was accompanied by sweeping standardisation 
of components and large-scale mechanised production that made it difficult for small 
British firms to compete with the large foreign firms.88
Nevertheless, the question remains why investors were willing to take the risk 
with such speculative offers. One answer lies in the cultivation of an enthusiasm 
for innovation among potential shareholders, another in changing practices of 
investment. The promotion of Colour Snapshots (1928) Ltd to potential customers 
emphasised not pure innovation, but the availability of something long desired 
and expected. However, innovation is the aspect that Colour Snapshots advertised 
to investors: ‘the first method of producing colour printed photographs using a 
standard camera’ (emphasis added). Shareholders were investing not just in a 
product and a company, but in the concept of innovation itself. Investors were 
primed to value technological innovation by a fanfare built across a wide range of 
media during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The value attached 
to innovation from an investor perspective accorded with a growing economic 
consensus that competition in innovation is the driving force of capitalism – a 
position most associated with the economist Joseph A. Schumpeter.89 For the 
investor, the thrill of the new was not tainted by the potential disruption that 
dogged every incremental technological change for the consumer, who had to 
switch from one type of radio set to another, one kind of camera to another. 
Innovation was associated positively with the figure of the heroic entrepreneur and 
with modernity. Even more than prospective customers, prospective investors 
appear to have been enticed by ideas of modernity, innovation and novelty. 
They were persistently addressed by advertisements emphasising the modernity 
of the 1928 new issues, and newspaper articles repeating the sometimes inflated 
claims of the companies regarding the popularity of products.
Faced with such enticing future visions, investors failed to question the compa-
nies’ ability to deliver on the promised technology, as well as consumers’ willingness 
to accommodate it. This is partly because of a change in investment practices: the large 
number and low price of the Colour Snapshots shares (figure 6) indicates that, as with 
the other new issues of the period, investors were drawn from a wide and diverse pool. 
It was not simply the new shareholders’ inexperience but also their volume that 
inhibited their ability to challenge the firm. Janette Rutterford and Dimitris P. 
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Years, London: Institute of Electrical 
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Radio Industry, Economic History Review, 
65:4 (2012), 1314.
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Development was published in German in 
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Sotiropoulos explain that the shareholding class in Britain had expanded between the 
1870s and the Great War, spurred on by the growing financial press, the rise of the 
company promoters who marketed new firms to potential investors and legislation 
such as the Married Women Property Acts of 1870 and 1882, which enabled married 
women to become shareholders. After the war, government war securities – certifi-
cates and bonds – had acclimatised more of the public to the practice of investing their 
savings. Rutterford and Sotiropoulos cite a 1920 study of Selfridge’s share registers 
which listed among the most recent investors ‘a cabinet maker, a gas collector, a clerk, 
a nurse, a housekeeper, a school mistress’.90 Class and gender did not make share-
holders automatically vulnerable to exploitation, but their quantity and greater 
geographical dispersion did. The sheer number of shareholders, each holding only a 
few shares, reduced individual shareholder influence on the company, while distance 
from the London Stock Exchange made them more susceptible to misinformation 
from a dubious financial press. The ‘scattered body of small holders’, as the Economist 
called them in 1929, facilitated more corruption and unaccountability from the firms, 
and enabled shady financial practices.91
Shady Promoters and Underpricing
If inexperience and reliance on untested patents are factors in the failure of 
Colorsnap, so was a lack of capital. Most of the analyses of the success and failure 
of the new media technologies of the 1920s emphasise problems with technical 
quality, poor industrial organisation, foreign competition and poor sales. They 
tend to agree with Geoff Brown’s diagnosis that these companies suffered ‘over- 
ambition, creative confusion, high start-up costs and the shadow of the world 
economic depression’.92 However, Murphy draws attention to the limited capital 
that these small firms held.93 With patents as their core assets, they were quick to 
turn to the Stock Exchange.
Figure 6. Colour Snapshots (1928) Ltd 
share certificate. Private collection.
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The stock market flotation did not resolve this undercapitalisation. Colour 
Snapshots (1928) Ltd was heavily oversubscribed, meaning there were more 
applications than shares available on its first day of trading, and the company 
ended the day with shares worth more than they had been at the start. Rather than 
suggesting success, this is likely to be a sign of underpricing.94 Company promo-
ters underpriced shares as a means of creating demand, and the promoters 
themselves would often take shares in payment for their services, so they would 
profit while the company ended up with less capital than it needed. We can see 
this in the case of Colour Snapshots (1928) Ltd. Its authorised capital was £350,000 
divided into 1,750,000 shares of four shillings each, but only £150,000 worth of 
shares (750,000 shares) were offered to the public. Of the other £200,000 worth, 
three-tenths went to Arthur John Clark, the managing director, and seven-tenths 
to the issuing house Beaconsfield Trust, directed by Louis Henry Jackson, the 
company promoter. As a result, and according to the winding up order, the 
company began its operation with just under £150,000 in capital.
Underpricing was a technique of ‘shady’ promoters. These were often unre-
gulated outside brokers or sharepushers who were not registered members of the 
London Stock Exchange. They took advantage of a gap in the market produced by 
the refusal of the big merchant banks to invest in British industry, especially in 
small-scale concerns – companies valued at under £200,000. Capital shortages 
incentivised firms to issue shares in order to raise capital. Furthermore, the 
London Stock Exchange’s weak regulation, its lack of transparency and the 
absence of any vetting of applications made these disreputable operations 
possible.95 These promoters exploited the way that the large number of new issues 
by small firms produced a really confusing diversity for the first-time investor. 
Among their ruses was one used by Jackson, who followed the flotation of Colour 
Snapshots (1928) Ltd with the flotation of another company, Colour Snapshots 
(Foreign) Ltd, twenty-one days later. John Kinross, who worked for an outside 
broker in the City at the time, explains the approach:
One of the current tricks of this kind of issue was to exclude most of the overseas 
rights from the original company. If the public lapped up the original issue on 
these terms, another flotation for the foreign rights quickly appeared.96 
With Colour Snapshots (Foreign) Ltd, Jackson was not allocated shares directly 
but was entitled to one-fifth of the patent money that Clark received from the 
company. Clark and Jackson clearly benefitted from such arrangements. Parallels 
can be drawn with the sound film industry, where, as Murphy writes, the pro-
moters of eleven companies ‘together managed to increase the value of the shares 
they held by £388,897 while the value of the shares held by the public had fallen by 
nearly £500,000’.97
Jackson was the promotor of Colour Snapshots and Wireless Pictures (1928) 
Ltd, the company which produced the Fultograph, as well as International Talking 
Screen Productions that was part of a group of companies called Audible 
Filmcraft, wound up in June 1931.98 His subsequent career is not documented 
to my knowledge, but he is described in the published recollections of Kinross, 
whose description of their encounter is scathing. Visiting Jackson at the very 
moment he was in the process of floating Colour Snapshots (1928) Ltd, Kinross 
noted the enormous table that he presumed was ‘supplied by Drages Ltd on hire 
purchase’ – Drages was a well-known company that had built its reputation on 
‘furnishing out of income’. He also mentions a ‘distinctly over-decorative young 
secretary, whose natural habitat was, at best, a film studio’.99 The office, Kinross 
implies, is a facade set up to dupe naive investors. This description also implicitly 
associates Jackson with the illegitimate sharepushers of the period who tended to 
rent office space near the London Stock Exchange and furnish them lavishly. In a 
2018 article on sharepushers in the interwar period, Matthew Hollow cites a 
statement from the director of the Metropolitan Police:
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They are usually much better furnished and set out than many genuine 
businesses. There are plenty of telephones, every office equipment that is 
either necessary or unnecessary is usually there, and there is a general air of 
wealth and prosperity about the place.100 
Figure 7. Unknown, Colorol colour 
photograph of a woman next to a bush, ca. 
1930. The Kodak Collection at the National 
Science and Media Museum, Bradford, 
Object Number: 1990-5036/6071/67.
100 – Cited in Hollow, ‘Nation of Investors 
or a Procession of Fools?’, 151.
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As Murphy writes, 1919–29 was ‘the Golden Age of the fraudulent company 
promoter’.101 Jackson was clearly regarded, by Kinross at least, as one of these, 
although he was not a sharepusher in the definition Hollow gives, selling worthless 
or inferior securities, and nor did he run a bucket shop, which resembled betting 
shops with blackboards and ticker-tape machines and preyed on those with 
‘money and no brains’.102 Nor was he a respectable trader who had gone off the 
rails, like the notorious brilliantly named fraudster Horatio Bottomley, or 
Kinross’s own boss, Arthur Wheeler, convicted of using clients’ money to pay 
off his own loans or the very established Clarence Hatry, promoter of the 
Photomaton photobooth machines among other things, who was convicted of 
faking share certificates and famously sentenced to prison in 1929 for forgery and 
fraud. Hatry’s group of companies failed with a deficit of £13 million in 1929, 
sending the stock markets into the tailspin that culminated in the Wall Street 
Crash.103 Jackson had no prior reputation in the City, he appeared as if out of 
nowhere and vanished just as quickly, making only six issues before voluntarily 
liquidating his own company, the Beaconsfield Trust. He appears as a pure 
product of the financial bubble, appearing because conditions were right, because 
this was a way that money could be made and made quickly.
Colour Snapshots was too hastily launched onto the stock market, embol-
dened and enabled by the market in patents and lacking any other way to raise the 
capital to thoroughly research and develop the process. Jackson’s strategy of 
underpricing ensured that the company was undercapitalised. In the absence of 
the funds to realise the product it had so successfully publicised, the company 
attempted to license its patents or sell itself as a going concern to the big 
manufacturers, which explains why it was so slow to establish the printing 
company. At some point, Ilford Ltd must have made it clear that it would not 
take responsibility for the venture, and by early 1929 Colour Snapshots (1928) Ltd 
had made unsuccessful approaches to both Kodak and Agfa. Eventually, Colour 
Snapshots (Foreign) Ltd did succeed in licensing the patents to Agfa-Ansco in the 
USA, which produced a film called Colorol between 1929 and 1930, with better 
results, technically and aesthetically, than Colorsnap achieved (figure 7).104
Conclusion
The blossoming of various new photographic concerns in the late 1920s came in 
the context of the boom in new technological start-ups, against the background of 
the growing power of large US and German firms, and an unstable world 
economy.105 Evidently, there were serious difficulties with Colorsnap as a com-
mercial concern and with the patents on which it relied. But its fate was deter-
mined by the financial dealings of the city of London, and the ways in which 
patents and share-issues were deployed within the new media bubble of 1928–29, 
as well as a climate of speculative investment that overvalued novelty and 
innovation.
Writing about Clarence Hatry, P. S. Manley notes that ‘To a large extent, any 
study of fraud is also a study of the art of the contemporary possible’.106 The case 
of Colorsnap might also be understood in terms of ‘the art of the contemporary 
possible’. The questions it raises concern not merely whether a mass amateur 
colour print process was possible years before it actually arrived, but what possi-
bilities might be explored and exploited through the patenting and marketing of 
colour photography processes in the period. The case of Colorsnap raises the 
larger question of what drives innovation in photography, successful or otherwise, 
and what kinds of activity shape the availability of photographic technologies and 
therefore of modes of picture making. The set of practices that made Colour 
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Snapshots fail are not reducible to incompetence, misfortune, technical flaws or 
the unpredictable desires of consumers. Rather, they are opportunistic practices of 
invention, financing and speculation made possible by historical circumstance.
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